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THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF 
DATA-DRIVEN ANTITRAFFICKING EFFORTS 
Jennifer Musto, Ph.D.* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Interest in using technology to respond to human trafficking has 
occurred alongside the explosive growth of networked, predictive, and 
automated technologies over the last decade. In the United States, 
technological innovators have entered the antitrafficking space, a trend 
preceded by calls from policymakers, law enforcement agents, and 
some nonprofit organization advocates, to examine not only how 
technology contributes to human trafficking but also the ways in which 
it might be used to combat it.1 In 2012, for instance, President Obama 
described the utility of leveraging technology to fight trafficking: 
“[W]e’re turning the tables on the traffickers. Just as they are now 
using technology and the Internet to exploit their victims, we’re going 
to harness technology to stop them.”2 
A key idea in antitrafficking discussions is that 
technology—particularly “disruptive” data-driven technologies—can 
be used to thwart traffickers and at the same time assist people 
assumed to be “at risk” of trafficking. More recently, technologies like 
algorithms, machine learning, and dark web search tools have been 
integrated into countertrafficking efforts.3 For some, these tools are 
                                                                                                             
* Jennifer Musto is an Associate Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies at Wellesley College. She is 
an interdisciplinary scholar whose research explores the laws, technologies, and modes of governance 
designed to respond to human trafficking and sex work in the United States. Her book, Control and 
Protect: Collaboration, Carceral Protection, and Domestic Sex Trafficking in the United States 
(University of California Press, 2016), examines state, nonstate, and technology responses to domestic 
sex trafficking situations in the U.S. and she has lectured and published widely on these topics.  
 1. Jennifer Musto, The Posthuman Anti-Trafficking Turn: Technology, Domestic Minor Sex 
Trafficking, and Augmented Human-Machine Alliances, in HUMAN TRAFFICKING RECONSIDERED 123, 
123–24 (Kimberly Kay Hoang & Rhacel Salazar Parreñas eds., 2014). 
 2. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Clinton Global Initiative (Sept. 25, 2012), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/25/remarks-president-clinton-global-
initiative [https://perma.cc/KXP5-JJQU]. 
 3. See generally Kylie Foy, Artificial Intelligence Shines Light on the Dark Web, MIT NEWS (May 
13, 2019), http://news.mit.edu/2019/lincoln-laboratory-artificial-intelligence-helping-investigators-fight-
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seen as critical in identifying traffickers who use technology to exploit 
victims and evade law enforcement detection. Yet, assumptions about 
technology do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, conversations about what 
technology can and cannot do reflect fears, anxieties, aspirations, and 
inequalities that exist in society.4 
Consider the word “disruption.” When stakeholders in the U.S. 
describe a new technology as disruptive, they implicitly suggest that it 
has the ability to positively contribute to social change. Optimistic 
forecasts suggesting connective technologies would have the capacity 
to uproot businesses and politics were commonplace in technology 
circles in the mid-to late 2000s, with some commentators going so far 
as to suggest that equality, freedom, and human rights are tied to the 
development of disruptive technologies.5 In 2020, the idea that 
disruptive technologies are uniformly positive seems naive and even 
dangerous. 
A much-needed public discussion has recently emerged that centers 
on the liabilities of digital tools and the biases, discrimination, and 
inequalities reproduced through them.6 Yet, less attention has centered 
on the ethics and harms surrounding humanitarian efforts, including 
data-driven antitrafficking efforts. This is despite the fact that 
humanitarian activities like commercial and law enforcement efforts 
rely on surveillance techniques developed within a “surveillance 
capitalist” system.7 Just as digital tools once framed as advancing 
democratic ideals are now viewed by many Americans as authorizing 
mass surveillance on an unprecedented scale, so too I would suggest 
that data-driven antitrafficking efforts are not as straightforward or as 
                                                                                                             
dark-web-crime-0513 [https://perma.cc/J9VM-TBZ9]. 
 4. DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 15 (2014). 
 5. Eric Schmidt & Jared Cohen, The Digital Disruption: Connectivity and the Diffusion of Power, 
FOREIGN AFF.,  Nov.–Dec. 2010, at 75, 85.   
 6. Dipayan Ghosh, The Commercialization of Decision-Making: Towards a Regulatory Framework 
to Address Machine Bias over the Internet, GOVERNANCE EMERGING NEW WORLD, May 6, 2019 at 1, 10, 
https://www.hoover.org/research/commercialization-decision-making-towards-regulatory-framework-
address-machine-bias-over [https://perma.cc/AHW4-L5SM]. 
 7. See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (2019); Mark 
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helpful as their supporters believe. Instead, those efforts carry risks 
that warrant public attention and debate. 
Over the course of the past several years, my research has 
investigated how and why antitrafficking stakeholders have come to 
view technology as so crucial to addressing trafficking—particularly 
sex trafficking situations involving youths and adults.8 While it is 
evident that the goals of antitrafficking technology initiatives are 
well-intentioned, the impact of tech-augmented efforts is mixed at best 
and questionable at worst. There are several distinct reasons why 
antitrafficking technologies have failed to deliver on their promises. 
First, ideas about the benefits of technology are based on a lot of 
uninterrogated assumptions rooted in cultural beliefs about progress 
and the ability of technology to facilitate it in lieu of wider structural 
change.9 Second, discussions about how technologies ought to be used 
(and by whom) emerged within a global antitrafficking movement 
shaped by enduring political and ideological debates.10 Briefly, some 
of these concerns include but are not limited to the following: the 
conflation of sex work with sex trafficking and the positioning of 
human trafficking as a crime control issue; the circulation of “sketchy” 
data to describe the scale and overestimate the scope of human 
trafficking; and disparities between the estimated number of victims 
and the actual number of victims identified.11 These fissures predate 
interest in technology in the antitrafficking space. However, attention 
to technology has enhanced the influence of some of the most powerful 
                                                                                                             
 8. See, e.g., JENNIFER MUSTO, CONTROL AND PROTECT: COLLABORATION, CARCERAL PROTECTION, 
AND DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES 50 (2016); Musto, supra note 1; Jennifer Lynne 
Musto & danah boyd, The Trafficking-Technology Nexus, 21 SOC. POL. 461, 462 (2014). 
 9. Musto & boyd, supra note 8. 
 10. Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and 
Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1678 (2010). 
 11. Rita Haverkamp, Victims of Human Trafficking: Considerations from a Crime Prevention 
Perspective, in WHAT IS WRONG WITH HUMAN TRAFFICKING? 53, 69 (Ester Herlin-Karnell et al. eds., 
2019); Ella Cockbain & Kate Bowers, Human Trafficking for Sex, Labour and Domestic Servitude: How 
Do Key Trafficking Types Compare and What Are Their Predictors?, 72 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 9, 11 
(2019); Jo Goodey, Human Trafficking: Sketchy Data and Policy Responses, 8 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. 
JUST. 421, 437 (2008); Heidi Hoefinger et al., Community-Based Responses to Negative Health Impacts 
of Sexual Humanitarian Anti-Trafficking Policies and the Criminalization of Sex Work and Migration in 
the US, SOC. SCI., no. 1, 2020, at 1, 2; Carole S. Vance, States of Contradiction: Twelve Ways to Do 
Nothing About Trafficking While Pretending to, 78 SOC. RES. 933, 935–36 (2011); Ronald Weitzer, The 
Movement to Criminalize Sex Work in the United States, 37 J. L. & SOC’Y 61, 66 (2010). 
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antitrafficking stakeholders, while lessening the influence of others.12 
For instance, state actors like law enforcement agents, along with their 
nongovernmental advocate partners, are the ones who determine if “a 
person’s involvement in the sex industry is voluntary or coerced and 
whether they are entitled to protection, punishment, or some 
combination” of those factors.13 Yet, tech actors (i.e., nonhuman 
trafficking experts) increasingly wield discretionary power to decide 
what qualifies and ultimately counts as sexual exploitation. This 
suggests that ideological divisions that already surround 
antitrafficking efforts have become more intensified now that human 
trafficking is understood as a technological problem that can be 
“fixed” with technical solutions.14 
Moreover, in an age of surveillance where human and automated 
decision-making are increasingly intertwined, at-risk groups endure 
heightened surveillance and as a result “become prone to punishment 
and criminalization.”15 People seen as vulnerable to trafficking (both 
trafficked persons and adults engaged in consensual sex work) 
likewise face risks from antitrafficking efforts reliant on carceral 
approaches and data-driven responses.16 As antitrafficking activities 
have taken a decidedly sociotechnical turn, sex workers and people at 
risk of trafficking must not only contend with laws that still broadly 
criminalize sexual labor but must also navigate an antitrafficking 
landscape where third-party actors contribute to prevention and 
identification efforts that supplement and widely support law 
enforcement efforts.17 
                                                                                                             
 12. Mitali Thakor & danah boyd, Networked Trafficking: Reflections on Technology and the 
Anti-Trafficking Movement, 37 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 277, 286–87 (2013). 
 13. Hoefinger et al., supra note 11; see also MUSTO, supra note 8, at 28. 
 14. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 71–72; Musto, supra note 1, at 127–28; Musto & boyd, supra note 8, at 
474. 
 15.  See generally VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, 
POLICE AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018); Kathryn Henne & Emily I. Troshynski, Intersectional 
Criminologies for the Contemporary Moment: Crucial Questions of Power, Praxis and Technologies of 
Control, 27 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 55, 60 (2019).  
 16.  See generally Jennifer Musto, Mitali Thakor & Borislav Gerasimov, Between Hope and Hype: 
Critical Evaluations of Technology’s Role in Anti-Trafficking, ANTI-TRAFFICKING REV., April 2020, at 1. 
 17. MARK LATONERO ET AL., UNIV. S.C. ANNENBERG CTR. ON COMMC’N LEADERSHIP & POLICY, 
THE RISE OF MOBILE AND THE DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGY-FACILITATED TRAFFICKING 8, 19 (2012); 
Musto & boyd, supra note 8, at 463; Thakor & boyd, supra note 12. 
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Notably, a comprehensive empirical account of antitrafficking 
technology initiatives is limited. Indeed, for all of the attention and 
resources now focused on integrating technology into 
countertrafficking efforts, very little empirical research exists on these 
efforts or their overall impact.18 Despite limited social science research 
on these developments, it has become increasingly clear that a change 
to how scholars, policymakers, and members of the global 
antitrafficking community approach the topic of technology is long 
overdue.19 For instance, rather than asking if technology is helpful or 
harmful—a line of inquiry that circulates in some governmental and 
intergovernmental spaces and which can inadvertently frame 
technology as neutral and inevitable—I believe it is more productive 
to explore some of the presumptive expectations that surround 
conversations about technology.20 Unpacking assumptions about 
technology is crucial not only in challenging the idea that technology 
can solve trafficking but also in highlighting real but widely 
unacknowledged risks that accompany the integration of technology in 
countertrafficking efforts. The first step towards these ends is to 
broaden the focus, for instance by exploring a few animating 
questions: 
                                                                                                             
 18. DANAH BOYD ET AL., HUMAN TRAFFICKING & TECHNOLOGY: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF 
CHILDREN IN THE U.S. 1 (2011), http://www.indiana.edu/~traffick/_resources/_literature/_research/ 
_assets/Human-Trafficking-and-Technology.pdf [https://perma.cc/CT8A-DNGG]. In an effort to advance 
empirical research in this area, I co-edited a special issue on technology and antitrafficking for the journal 
Anti-Trafficking Review with Mitali Thakor. See Musto, Thakor & Gerasimov, supra note 16. 
 19. BOYD ET AL., supra note 18, at 10. 
 20. Thakor & boyd, supra note 12, at 287. For instance, to commemorate the European Union’s 
Anti-Trafficking Day, the Austrian Task Force on Combating Human Trafficking organized a conference 
focused on technology that framed the question of technology as a chance or challenge. Technology and 
Combating Human Trafficking—Chance or Challenge?, LUDWIG BOLTZMANN INST. HUM. RTS., 
https://bim.lbg.ac.at/en/events/event/2019/10/16/technology-and-combating-human-trafficking-chance-
or-challenge [https://perma.cc/R8ZA-3JZ6] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). More recently, there has been an 
emphasis on transforming the “liability of technology into an asset.” Using Technology to Combat 
Trafficking in Human Beings: OSCE Alliance Against Trafficking Conference Explores How to Turn a 
Liability into an Asset, ORG. FOR SECURITY & CO-OPERATION EUROPE (Apr. 9, 2019), 
https://www.osce.org/secretariat/416744 [https://perma.cc/G8G8-HNNY] [hereinafter Using Technology 
to Combat Trafficking]. 
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1. What commonsense ideas shape antitrafficking 
technology initiatives? 
2. What are the effects of these efforts? 
3. What lessons can be learned from past activities in 
shaping future efforts? 
Exploring these questions offers the chance to complicate 
widespread but empirically untested assumptions that circulate in 
many antitrafficking circles—for instance, assumptions that suggest 
that creating more public–private partnerships and adding automated 
technologies to the mix of antitrafficking efforts will invariably 
support people at risk of trafficking, especially individuals at risk of 
sexual exploitation. In addition to interrogating the dominant 
commonsense ethos that surrounds antitrafficking activities, this 
Article aims to spark discussion about future antitrafficking prevention 
and protection efforts grounded in notions of data ethics and 
transparency, as well as principles of accountability, harm reduction, 
and racial, gender, sexual, and economic justice. 
I.   Assumptions and Implications 
Many assumptions lie behind antitrafficking technology initiatives 
in the U.S. that my and other scholars’ work seeks to unpack.21 Why 
focus on assumptions? First, they reveal a great deal about the ways in 
which precious resources are allocated and countertrafficking efforts 
are focused. Second, assumptions have practical implications and help 
to assess how antitrafficking efforts benefit some groups but constrain 
others. Third, in order to understand the effects of technology 
initiatives and to evaluate whether they are beneficial or risky, it is 
important to understand the ideas and values that shape them. 
Two interconnected ideas undergird and arguably overshadow all 
others in the United States: (1) sex trafficking is a more pressing issue 
                                                                                                             
 21.  Musto & boyd, supra note 8. For a complementary yet distinctive assessment of the assumptions 
and tensions surrounding antitrafficking technology efforts, see Sanja Milivojevic, Heather Moore & 
Marie Segrave, Freeing the Modern Slaves, One Click at a Time: Theorising Human Trafficking, Modern 
Slavery, and Technology, ANTI-TRAFFICKING REV., April 2020, at 16. 
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than labor trafficking; and (2) dominant antiprostitution (i.e., 
neo-abolitionist) approaches are best equipped to address it. U.S. 
government policies have overwhelmingly focused attention on sex 
trafficking in general and the sexual exploitation of minors in 
particular.22 This is despite the fact that scholars note there are likely 
more cases of labor trafficking than sex trafficking.23 Such 
assumptions are baked into U.S. laws and policies.24 One of the 
enduring legacies of the U.S. benchmark antitrafficking legislation, the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000 (and its 
subsequent reauthorizations), is its sustained focus on sex trafficking 
situations involving women and girls, with far less attention on 
exploitative labor situations that are nonsexual in nature and involve 
migrants.25 
Antitrafficking laws also promote an antiprostitution or 
“neo-abolitionist” agenda in the U.S. and globally.26 As the legal 
scholar Janie Chuang observes, when the U.S. anointed itself as the 
“global sheriff” of antitrafficking policy in the 2000s during the 
George W. Bush Administration, it used the TVPA and the “economic 
sanctions regime” that accompanied it as a “vehicle for the 
neo-abolitionists to promote their anti-prostitution agenda 
worldwide.”27 Twenty years after the passage of the TVPA and 
following the 2018 passage of the Allow States and Victims to Fight 
Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA), the effects of U.S. 
antitrafficking laws and attendant countertrafficking efforts have come 
into even sharper focus: laws to address human trafficking still 
conflate sex work with sex trafficking and still frame trafficking as a 
crime control rather than a social justice issue.28 Just as the TVPA 
stretched its antitrafficking policy reach beyond U.S. borders, so has 
                                                                                                             
 22. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 114; Chuang, supra note 10; Weitzer, supra note 11, at 73. 
 23. Vance, supra note 11, at 936. 
 24. Id. at 933. 
 25. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 37; Vance, supra note 11, at 933, 939. 
 26. Chuang, supra note 10, at 1679. 
 27.  Id.; Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat 
Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437, 439 (2006).  
 28. Elizabeth Bernstein, Carceral Politics as Gender Justice? The “Traffic in Women” and Neoliberal 
Circuits of Crime, Sex, and Rights, 41 THEORY & SOC’Y 233, 253 (2012); Hoefinger et al., supra note 11. 
7
Musto: The Limits and Possibilities of Data-Driven Antitrafficking Effor
Published by Reading Room,
1154 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:4 
FOSTA redrawn boundaries too, in this instance by advancing a model 
of governance that de facto deputizes internet providers as third-party, 
nonstate enforcers of antiprostitution policy, a form of networked 
neo-abolition.29 
What FOSTA and attendant sociotechnical efforts to address 
trafficking reveal is a distinct yet understudied form of governance in 
development: an antitrafficking approach and enforcement strategy 
that blurs the boundaries between state and nonstate authority.30 Yet, 
integrating technology into countertrafficking efforts also muddles the 
lines between prevention and protection efforts. In earlier work, I 
argued that youth and adults seen as at risk of sex trafficking 
sometimes experience a combination of punishment and 
protection—what I referred to as “carceral protection.”31 This 
arrest-to-assist model of collaborative intervention brings law 
enforcement agents together with nonstate actors in new ways that blur 
the lines between state and nonstate authority. Yet as the concept quite 
literally suggests, the protective part of carceral protectionism is 
temporally specific and occurs after state and nonstate authorities 
identify people determined to be in exploitative situations, which is to 
say after the exploitation occurred.32 What I failed to fully appreciate 
until recently is that ideas about risk in general and the production of 
the at-risk sex trafficking subjects in particular authorize an array of 
activities on the front end too, which is to say on the prevention side. 
This is where technology and a form of collaborative, algorithmic 
governance comes into play and coheres in discursively producing 
at-risk victim–survivor subjects. 
For instance, tech-mediated efforts to identify victims and assist 
investigators may utilize web scraping, indicator mining, and the 
amassment of data in the development of algorithms.33 Data collection, 
                                                                                                             
 29. Ben Chapman-Schmidt, ‘Sex Trafficking’ as Epistemic Violence, ANTI-TRAFFICKING REV., April 
2019, at 172, 176–79; Musto, Thakor & Gerasimov, supra note 16; J Musto et al., FOSTA-SESTA, 
Networked Neo-Abolition, and Sexual Humanitarian Scope Creep, Presentation Paper, Law and Society 
Association, Washington D.C., June 2019 (on file with author).  
 30. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 70. 
 31. See generally id. 
 32. Id. at 141–42. 
 33. MAYANK KEJRIWAL ET AL., FLAGIT: A SYSTEM FOR MINIMALLY SUPERVISED HUMAN 
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aggregation, and sorting practices can, in turn, construct 
representations about exploitation with predictive potential, including 
predicting where future exploitation may occur.34 This gives rise to an 
array of surveillance prevention efforts, activities that indeterminately 
monitor persons assumed to be at risk but whose identities remain 
unknown to authorities alongside efforts to monitor people identified 
as “trafficked,” irrespective of whether they themselves identify as 
such. Heightened monitoring is justified on the grounds of curtailing 
exploitation in the first place (prevention) and limiting future harm 
(protection).35 Fulfilling twin prevention and protection aims means 
that government actors form partnerships with nongovernmental tech 
innovators and academic researchers and utilize automated tools in 
their countertrafficking efforts. This raises pressing questions about 
the effects of a nascent data-driven, carcerally-oriented collaborative 
model of governance in development, one that crowdsources the 
protection and prevention of vulnerable populations from different 
state and nonstate actors. In the sections that follow, I draw on 
questions featured earlier to elaborate on my argument.36 In exploring 
each question, I share some findings from my own and others’ research 
findings and highlight questions and challenges that surround 
data-driven, antitrafficking efforts. 
The following is a provisional list of some of the most common 
assumptions I have encountered in the context of my research and the 
practical effects resulting from each one: 
 
                                                                                                             
TRAFFICKING INDICATOR MINING 1 (2017); ABBY STYLIANOU ET AL., HOTELS-50K: A GLOBAL HOTEL 
RECOGNITION DATASET 3 (2019), https://www2.seas.gwu.edu/~pless/papers/Hotels50k.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/82AP-K6NJ]; Musto & boyd, supra note 8, at 473. 
 34.  Henne & Troshynski, supra note 15, at 64. 
 35. See, e.g., MUSTO, supra note 8, at 53, 64–65. 
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a. Assumption: Traffickers use technology to facilitate 
sex trafficking and evade law enforcement 
detection.37 
 
• Implication: Law enforcement can leverage 
technology to gather data, investigate suspected 
traffickers’ activities, and identify persons at risk 
of trafficking. 
 
b. Assumption: Law enforcement lack sufficient 
resources and technical capacity to respond to 
challenges posed by technology.38 
 
• Implication: Law enforcement efforts must be 
enhanced through the assistance of nonstate 
actors and by integrating automated technologies 
and artificial intelligence into countertrafficking 
efforts. 
 
c. Assumption: Antitrafficking interventions are 
uniformly helpful.39 
 
• Implication: By supplementing state efforts with 
technology and collaborative partnerships, 
people in trafficking situations or those seen as at 
risk of trafficking will be better assisted. 
 
My aim in listing these assumptions is not to categorically deny their 
validity. Indeed, they often reflect commonsense notions behind 
antitrafficking initiatives and are grounded in the daily, practical needs 
of some antitrafficking actors. For instance, law enforcement agencies 
                                                                                                             
 37. See, e.g., Hannah Devlin, Trafficking Industry Hit as ‘Sex Worker’ Chatbots Fool Thousands, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/feb/13/sex-worker-
chatbots-fool-thousands-to-hit-trafficking-industry [https://perma.cc/X7WJ-PTT6]. 
 38. See BOYD ET AL., supra note 18, at 8. 
 39. See id. at 1. 
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are tasked with enforcing antitrafficking laws.40 It is therefore sensible 
that law enforcement agents are interested in learning about how 
suspected traffickers use technology and that some see clear benefits 
of having more technical tools at their disposal to pursue 
investigations.41 Likewise, if law enforcement agencies lack sufficient 
training and resources to investigate trafficking situations facilitated 
by technology or to gather information on suspected traffickers’ digital 
footprints—as some in law enforcement argue—it is logical that many 
also believe that creating partnerships with nonstate actors and using 
innovative tools can be supportive of their work.42 Yet taken together, 
what this list of assumptions and implications reveals is the kinds of 
activities and the particular actors who have come to play a powerful, 
if not the most powerful, role in antitrafficking technology initiatives: 
law enforcement and nonstate actors interested in assisting law 
enforcement through technical innovation. 
It is important to stress that competing agendas and divergent 
approaches to countertrafficking efforts are not new. However, 
growing attention to technology has enhanced the influence of 
powerful stakeholders, like law enforcement actors, as well as nonstate 
partners, with technical expertise.43 The rise of public–private 
partnerships, together with the entrenchment of the dominant criminal 
justice-oriented, prosecution-focused approach to addressing 
trafficking is significant because it expands crime control approaches 
through technology.44 
II.   Leveraging Technology, Gathering Data 
Data is valuable to antitrafficking work. In the context of different 
research projects, I interviewed several nongovernmental advocates 
                                                                                                             
 40. Id. 
 41. Inter-Agency Coordination Grp. Against Trafficking in Persons, Human Trafficking and 
Technology: Trends, Challenges and Opportunities, at 3–4 (July 2019), 
https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/report/human-trafficking-and-
technology-trends-challenges-and-opportunities/Human-trafficking-and-technology-trends-challenges-
and-opportunities-WEB...-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6JX-4R3N] [hereinafter ICAT]. 
 42. Id. at 4. 
 43. Haverkamp, supra note 11, at 68; Thakor & boyd, supra note 12, at 288. 
 44. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 36. 
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and law enforcement agents who argue that technology, and more 
specifically data, is crucial in building cases. Other scholars find that 
law enforcement view digital evidence as important to their 
investigative work.45 For example, if the internet allows suspected 
traffickers to advertise victims and “connect more easily with a large 
market of users[,]” then “leveraging technology” provides the tools 
and techniques to collect and analyze data about suspected traffickers’ 
activities.46 Examples of valuable data include mobile phone calls, text 
messages, financial transactions, GPS patterns, automatic license plate 
readers, geolocation data, etc.47 A police officer I interviewed for my 
book saw data as an “evidentiary goldmine,” describing it as an 
invaluable asset to investigators. Another officer suggested that 
gathering suspected traffickers’ digital traces offers a “treasure trove 
of material” that can make cases for investigators.48 Law enforcement 
also see data as critical in corroborating relationships between 
traffickers and the people they are alleged to exploit.49 For some law 
enforcement, data is beneficial on the grounds of victim protection; 
digital evidence takes pressure off of victims to testify against people 
accused of trafficking them.50 An alternate public defender I 
interviewed in 2017 lamented this trend, noting that though letting 
digital evidence like text messages stand in for victims is beneficial for 
prosecutors, it invariably complicates his work and the work of defense 
attorneys. As he explains: 
I think what is a more interesting issue that should be 
publicized is what we’re seeing more of now is DAs are 
proceeding to trial without the victims, and allowing the 
liberal interpretation of the penal code and the evidence code 
to allow all the text messages to come in, and not even have 
anyone on the stand . . . It is definitely being utilized 
                                                                                                             
 45. SYLVIA WALBY ET AL., STUDY ON THE GENDER DIMENSION OF TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS 
165 (2016). 
 46. ICAT, supra note 41, at 2. 
 47. See LATONERO ET AL., supra note 17, at iv–v. 
 48. Id. at 29; MUSTO, supra note 8, at 49–50. 
 49. LATONERO ET AL., supra note 17, at 29. 
 50. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 66; Musto, supra note 1, at 131–32. 
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more . . . Yes, from a prosecution standpoint, it works 
lovely, because [there is] no one to question. The police 
officer is just a conduit for the information.51 
Moreover, as enthusiasm about the integration of data-driven 
antitrafficking efforts grows, another assumption has emerged too, 
chiefly, that law enforcement agencies do not have sufficient resources 
or the technical capacity to respond to challenges posed by 
technology.52 Enter nonstate actors and tech innovators. 
III.   Creating Partnerships and Building New Tools 
The widely held assumption that police and law enforcement 
agencies do not have sufficient resources, capacity, or training to 
rigorously pursue human trafficking investigations opened the door to 
researchers, tech innovators and moral entrepreneurs eager to 
supplement law enforcement work in this area. For example, a 
nongovernmental advocate I interviewed noted the value of data from 
escort and online classified ad sites, explaining “[t]hey provide a lot of 
data, and can that data help us address this issue? This is a role 
for . . . machine learning.”53 Data scraped from sites are used to train 
machine learning algorithms and may be used to assist law 
enforcement in identifying trafficked persons.54 A growing number of 
antitrafficking stakeholders agree that data scraped from open and dark 
web sources can be analyzed to assist law enforcement.55 A new field 
of research has developed that aims to use artificial intelligence (AI) 
to respond to human trafficking. This work includes machine learning, 
computer vision, and natural processing.56 AI countertrafficking 
initiatives require data—and massive amounts of it. For researchers 
seeking to develop innovative tools, online advertisement sites are also 
                                                                                                             
 51.  Skype Interview with a Public Defender, in Cal. (Oct. 19, 2017) (on file with author). The public 
defender’s name is withheld for confidentiality and ethics reasons. 
 52. Musto & boyd, supra note 8, at 468. 
 53. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 75. 
 54. Id. 
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rich sources of data.57 For instance, the Department of Defense 
Advanced Research Project Agency’s Memex program supports 
“research into domain-specific search,” and “has collected hundreds of 
millions of online sex advertisements, a significant (but unknown) 
number of which are believed to be sex (and human) trafficking.”58 
Research initiatives like those advanced by Memex are premised on 
the idea that law enforcement efforts are strengthened by integrating 
innovative technical tools with investigators’ toolkits.59 Cooperation 
between state and nonstate actors is also framed by authorities as 
crucial in helping law enforcement pursue investigations more 
efficiently and effectively.60 Nonstate actors, some of whom have 
developed tools to scrape and sort data, aid this work—even if 
indirectly. And in some jurisdictions, law enforcement personnel have 
begun to integrate software developed by nonstate actors into their 
investigative work. 
Memex software, for example, is used by the Manhattan District 
Attorney’s Office in their Human Trafficking Response Unit.61 In 
researching antitrafficking efforts in California, I learned of a human 
trafficking unit where detectives were using software developed by 
nonstate actors. An officer I interviewed from the unit saw the 
integration of software as unambiguously helpful, and a way for 
officers to focus on building cases.62 Yet, what is often missing from 
discussions about these protocol shifts are the legal questions that arise 
as law enforcement come to more heavily rely on automated tools. 
The absence of context in antitrafficking matters is another issue.63 
Having contextual insight may mean that investigators and the 
                                                                                                             
 57. Id. 
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technologists they partner with understand the differences between 
voluntary sex work and sex trafficking. For instance, an ad scraped 
from an open or deep web source is not, on its face, a clear indicator 
of sex trafficking. Some researchers and antitrafficking actors in the 
United States recognize this. However, as research on these trends 
suggests, the value afforded to “millions of online sex advertisements” 
remains, and the indicators created from it hinge on its size, scalability, 
and presumed ability to identify patterns, connect dots, draw 
inferences, and make visible phenomena that would otherwise be 
hidden.64 Yet context is lost when trafficking is treated solely as a 
technical problem and its complex features are reduced to signals and 
indicators. 
Moreover, automated technologies are also framed as efficient, 
objective, and thus uniquely equipped to aid law enforcement in their 
efforts. However, a lot is still unknown about the precise ways in 
which technologists design these tools and about the ideological 
assumptions on which their functionality rests. Some of this has to do 
with the fact that tools developed to support countertrafficking 
technology efforts are proprietary, their features and technical design  
are opaque, and the methods used to define their parameters are a black 
box. And like other technologies of measurement and classification, 
data-driven tools are not neutral; rather, they function to “legitim[ize] 
certain forms of knowledge and experience, while rendering others 
invisible.”65 Anthropologist Sally Merry’s insightful observations 
about the rise of indicators in the human rights field is instructive in 
complicating the idea that indicators are objective.66 Though indicators 
may be viewed by some antitrafficking actors as reflecting “objective” 
reality and truth, they are imbued with ideological assumptions and 
“embedded [within] theories and values that shape apparently 
objective information and influence decisions.”67 In essence, 
                                                                                                             
note 8, at 81. 
 64. KEJRIWAL ET AL., supra note 33. 
 65.  Karen E.C. Levy, Intimate Surveillance, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 679, 687 (2015). 
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indicators make knowledge claims about social and political 
phenomena and such claims underwrite a “technology of 
governance.”68 
In applying this idea to antitrafficking efforts augmented by 
technology, what emerges is a governance strategy that relies on 
amassing data and enhancing law enforcement efforts.69 This strategy 
produces notions of risk that in turn authorizes technologies of control 
(for instance, enhanced surveillance of all forms of commercial sex) 
that unsettle neat distinctions between prevention and protection and 
state and nonstate authority.70 Paying attention to the ideologies that 
undergird antitrafficking efforts and mapping which bodies and whose 
experiences are rendered invisible is crucial, both in terms of assessing 
if these efforts are actually effective and whether they contribute to 
harms.     
IV.   Collateral Consequences of Networked Neo-Abolition 
Another assumption that circulates among antitrafficking 
stakeholders in the United States is that law enforcement focused, 
nonstate assisted interventions are uniformly helpful. In the 
technology space, a corollary assumption is that by supplementing law 
enforcement efforts with collaborative partnerships and technologies, 
people in trafficking situations as well as people at risk of trafficking 
will get help and assistance as a direct result of the technology. Yet 
this is not the case in the United States.71 Absent from public and 
stakeholder discussions are the ways in which seemingly protective 
antitrafficking policies, now supplemented with innovative tools, 
contribute to the arrest and criminalization of both victims of sex 
trafficking and voluntary sex workers, which can further contribute to 
an uptick in prostitution arrests in jurisdictions where these innovative 
approaches have been introduced.72 Though troubling, this is not 
                                                                                                             
 68. Id. at S85, S89. 
 69. Musto & boyd, supra note 8, at 469–70. 
 70. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 66; WALBY ET AL., supra note 45, at 167. 
 71. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 81. 
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completely surprising. Adults and youth viewed by authorities as 
victims of sex trafficking have long endured arrest and detention and 
been treated like “victim–offenders.”73 Moreover, because the 
criminal justice approach to countertrafficking in the United States is 
often based on the conflation of voluntary sex work with sex 
trafficking, there are punitive consequences for both sex trafficking 
victims and adult voluntary sex workers.74 Sex workers in the United 
States and globally have actively highlighted the health risks and 
human rights violations that accompany antiprostitution efforts framed 
as antitrafficking initiatives.75 
While this topic warrants a more in-depth discussion than space 
permits, a key point I want to make is that because antitrafficking 
initiatives conflate sex work with sex trafficking and because these 
same efforts prioritize criminal justice interventions, when augmented 
by technology and retooled by collaborative partnerships, this 
approach can create vulnerabilities for victims of sex trafficking and 
voluntary sex workers. Consider a few examples. Law enforcement 
have long posted fake ads and used various decoy strategies to identify 
(and sometimes arrest) people selling sex online.76 More recently, 
efforts to prevent sexual exploitation online have utilized automated 
tools with a focus on exploiters (i.e., what is oft referred to in 
antitrafficking circles as targeting the “demand side” of the sex 
trade).77 For instance, as part of an AI-augmented end demand 
campaign, the New York Police Department used 
“women”—presenting bots in human drag to target unsuspecting sex 
buyers.78 Some nonprofit agents masquerading as antitrafficking moral 
entrepreneurs have likewise pursued similar strategies, for instance by 
posting fake ads on sites where sexual services are known to be 
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advertised.79 The nonprofit agency Seattle Against Slavery is behind 
one recent disruptive AI-enhanced effort to deter sex buyers and uses 
chatbot sex worker decoys.80 Robert Beiser, the organization’s 
Executive Director, conceded, “not everyone selling sex online was a 
trafficking victim.”81 Nonetheless, he argues that the strategy his 
organization uses was developed based on the experiences of some 
trafficking survivors who had “reported . . . transactions [related to 
their trafficking situations] were typically initiated online.”82 
Prevention efforts that focus on ending male demand for 
commercial sex may appear to signal a move away from policy and 
enforcement strategies that myopically target sellers (i.e., people, 
though particularly women engaged in commercial sex either by 
choice or force).83 Yet, efforts to prevent trafficking do not focus solely 
on prospective exploiters; similarly, intensified efforts to pursue 
criminal prosecutions as a strategy of deterrence do not only implicate 
people alleged to have facilitated trafficking. Rather, in an 
antitrafficking environment that prioritizes criminalization strategies, 
people assumed to be at risk of trafficking can also experience arrest, 
detention, and mandated court participation.84 Others may experience 
law enforcement surveillance and different types of monitoring, 
screening, and filtering. For instance, some may have their images and 
content scraped and their digital footprints amassed in datasets to 
develop algorithms designed to investigate places where trafficking 
occurs (hotels for example).85 Still others may have their content 
risk-assessed. Nick Shapiro of Airbnb and Bradley Myles of Polaris, 
an antitrafficking organization, described their joint efforts as taking a 
“modern approach” to antislavery efforts, which hinges on developing 
enhanced screening, scoring, and risk-assessment methods to “mine 
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for signs of human trafficking in real time.”86 Yet it appears that efforts 
to prevent sexual exploitation online and identify prospective victims 
are not without consequence, evidenced by sex worker reports about 
restricted access to seemingly pedestrian activities (for example, 
making an Airbnb reservation).87 Not only do these examples aim to 
highlight the fact that data-driven antitrafficking efforts do not solely 
target prospective exploiters or leverage cooperative partnerships and 
automation to identify a trafficking survivor “in real time.” They 
produce notions of risk and “ways of seeing and knowing . . . that 
minimize individual complexity.”88 The sociotechnical production of 
at-risk victims in tech-oriented antitrafficking efforts are shaped by 
quantification and experts’ selective filtering of the exploitative 
experiences of some to broadly authorize the surveillance of many. 
Notions of risk further authorize technologies of control, for instance, 
enhanced surveillance techniques, that unsettle neat distinctions 
between prevention and protection and state and nonstate authority.89 
In describing how ideas about youth at risk turn complex situations 
and nuanced life experiences into equations, calculations, and 
algorithms, the sociologist Max Greenberg deftly explains how past 
experiences of violence and trauma shape predictions of the future: 
[E]xperiences become prophecies that can be applied to a 
different set of people . . . . [S]trangers’ experiences with 
violence and trauma can cause someone whom they have 
never met to be labeled as at risk. Crime data is used to mark 
noncriminals as at risk and injury data is used to mark 
healthy people as at risk. The meanings jump between arenas 
                                                                                                             
 86. Bradley Myles & Nick Shapiro, Taking a Modern Approach to Combatting Modern Slavery, 
MEDIUM (Feb. 18, 2018), https://medium.com/@AirbnbCitizen/taking-a-modern-approach-to-
combating-modern-slavery-227db96d732b [https://perma.cc/M9Y8-EWB4]. 
 87. EJ Dickson, Who’s Allowed to Use Airbnb?, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 9, 2020, 10:37 AM), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/airbnb-sex-worker-discrimination-935048/ 
[https://perma.cc/HTS5-WPEA]. 
 88. Henne & Troshynski, supra note 15, at 17. 
 89. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 71; WALBY ET AL., supra note 45, at 167. 
19
Musto: The Limits and Possibilities of Data-Driven Antitrafficking Effor
Published by Reading Room,
1166 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:4 
and individuals. Risk data are, in a sense, a map of the past 
that is used to predict the future.90 
Data about at-risk trafficked persons in a neo-abolitionist, networked 
landscape similarly lumps and jumps; it lumps a wide range of 
people’s experiences who trade sex into the categorical confines of a 
victim “at risk.” Ideas about risk and attendant cooperative efforts that 
utilize automated tools also jump between different kinds of sexual 
arrangements, flattening the diverse ways people arrange and facilitate 
sexual labor, while also foreclosing more nuanced discussions about 
ways people experience exploitation or develop different (noncarceral) 
strategies to address it. Past harm endured by some (e.g., survivors of 
trafficking who identify as such and whose exploitation was facilitated 
by technology) is selectively culled to predict future harms for many. 
Still, the accuracy of this prediction at scale is unknown. 
Heightened monitoring by nonstate actors and automated tools may 
aim to identify (and protect) prospective victims and deter or prevent 
exploitation altogether. Yet here again, this erases the experiences of 
a vast array of voluntary sex workers who do not identify as survivors 
of trafficking. It also subjects them to state and nonstate surveillance 
efforts that constrain their ability to mitigate the harms of a criminal 
legal system that still widely criminalizes sexual labor and their ability 
to function productively in society by earning an income, securing 
housing, and engaging in harm reduction strategies. And notably, in a 
networked neo-abolitionist landscape, harms are not limited to the 
criminal legal system nor exclusively perpetuated by state actors 
tasked with enforcing antitrafficking and prostitution laws (e.g., police 
officers).91 Sex workers and even self-identified trafficked persons 
face vulnerabilities from nonstate actors too—the “powerful 
adjacent”—including third-party intermediaries whose work supports 
and sometimes expands carceral agendas.92 Harms may also result 
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from automated systems in ways that have yet to be fully accounted 
for. 
For several years I have sought to identify and document harms 
resulting from data-driven efforts. This is challenging because what I 
call harms are seldom recognized or counted by officials. The harms 
people in sex trafficking situations may experience include having 
their mobile phones searched as well as contending with heightened 
online and offline monitoring by law enforcement and their nonstate 
partners.93 One person I interviewed for my book, Kiara, self-identifies 
as a victim of sex trafficking. Though she eventually received help 
from law enforcement, prior to that, she was arrested multiple times, 
put on probation, and required to complete a mandatory prostitution 
diversion program. In addition to all of that, she continues to endure 
other harms too. For example, every time she applies for a job, tries to 
get an apartment, or is required to submit to a background check, the 
data trail left from her history of arrests serves as a reminder that 
negotiating life after trafficking means dealing with a digital record 
about her past that limits her current and future choices.94 Sex workers, 
trafficked persons, and people labeled as at risk of sexual exploitation 
must contend with laws that still widely criminalize sex work while 
also navigating human-orchestrated, tech-augmented antitrafficking 
activities that police and algorithmically constrain their activities and 
behavior.95 Some of these tools rely on crowdsourced data and seem 
to rely on technical experts (but not necessarily human trafficking 
domain experts) who appear to unquestionably expect that their efforts 
will be welcomed and uniformly helpful.96 Too little empirical 
research exists to know for sure. But what is clear is that these activities 
raise questions about privacy, safety, and how to meaningfully protect 
trafficked persons not only from exploitative traffickers but also from 
the harms of tech-oriented antitrafficking interventions. And because 
vulnerabilities do not directly emanate from the criminal legal system, 
more typical criminal justice remedies (for instance, expunging a 
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criminal conviction) are insufficient, raising questions about how to 
document and meaningfully ameliorate such vulnerabilities. 
Another trend I have been following is the application of big data 
and the integration of facial recognition technologies in antitrafficking 
and border-enforcement activities.97 While there are clearly benefits to 
law enforcement, these technologies may also carry risks for those 
subjected to it, not only because the technology relies on people’s 
images to create data sets but also because this work commonly occurs 
without people’s knowledge or consent.98 In a 2016 paper titled, The 
Role of Technology in the Fight Against Human Trafficking, 
researchers note that “technology has facilitated the recording, storage 
and exchange of victims’ information . . . .”99 Paradoxically, the tools 
aimed at protecting victims may also subject them to invasive forms 
of surveillance, a trend that has the capacity to “undermine the 
fundamental rights of both the victims and other individuals who may 
be collaterally affected.”100 In addition to privacy risks, another 
concern centers on the ways in which automated technologies create 
what scholar Ruha Benjamin describes as a “digital caste system” that 
entrenches inequalities and increases discrimination.101 Taken 
together, these trends matter not only because of the effect on people 
who have experienced or who are vulnerable to trafficking but also 
because these tools cast a wide net and can adversely impact migrants 
and sex workers who do not self-identify as trafficked but are directly 
affected by countertrafficking efforts nonetheless. 
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V.   Lessons and Future Directions 
Efforts to transform technology from a “liability into an asset” 
undoubtedly open up new opportunities for law enforcement and 
technology innovators.102 However, the collaborative partnerships and 
tools used to support countertrafficking efforts also create risks, 
including but not limited to privacy risks for people vulnerable to 
trafficking.103 Not only is it rare in the United States for these risks to 
be publicly discussed, we also do not currently have a meaningful way 
to assist people if and when these tools get it wrong.104 For instance, 
how does a person flagged by an automated system as at risk of 
trafficking go about removing data about them from a database they 
may not even know exists? Data about actual people involved in 
vulnerable and possibly exploitative labor situations is the source 
material on which entire data sets are based; yet, who owns and 
controls the data? Do people vulnerable to trafficking get a say in how 
data about them is used? For instance, can they contest if they are 
categorized as a victim or a criminal offender? Do trafficked persons 
or people adversely impacted by countertrafficking efforts have the 
right to be forgotten?105 In the absence of a U.S. policy equivalent to 
the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
current U.S. antitrafficking laws might not be sufficiently equipped to 
remedy reputational harms and risks that may accompany data-driven 
interventions.106 Asking these questions and interrogating the 
assumptions behind the development and use of new technologies are 
important first steps in uncovering the limitations of the current 
countertrafficking landscape and in thinking about how to learn from 
the past to effectuate change in the future. The following ideas offer a 
tentative framework that could serve as a working platform to guide 
future innovation. 
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A.   Come for the Tech, Stay for the Data 
This first idea, “come for the tech, stay for the data,” riffs on a 
message I heard from sex worker activists in the late 2000s advising 
members of the public drawn to the topic of sex trafficking to “come 
for the sex, stay for the labor.” In my reading of it, this message aims 
to move public attention away from sensationalized depictions of sex 
trafficking and towards an understanding of the structural factors and 
inequalities that contribute to exploitation across different labor 
sectors. Inspired by sex worker rights activist insights, and the work of 
scholars and advocates tracking the detrimental impacts of mass 
surveillance and automated decision-making in all facets of social and 
political life, the slogan I want to propose is “come for the tech, stay 
for the data.” Staying for the data means understanding the immense 
value of data in countertrafficking projects while at the same time 
acknowledging that the benefits of this data are not equally shared or 
evenly distributed. Staying for the data also means that as more 
trafficking survivors, migrants and sex workers encounter 
tech-mediated antitechnology efforts and the different (human) actors 
and automated systems behind it, stakeholders must not only be 
attuned and responsive to risks that come with these efforts but 
proactive in preventing them in the first place. 
B.   Apply Sunshine to “Shadow” Data Sets and Practices 
The premise behind applying light to “shadow” data sets and those 
otherwise hidden from public view connects to the first point but 
extends it further by calling for the advancement of victim-centered 
data-protection principles. To apply sunshine to proprietary systems 
and data means thinking about the processes by which antitrafficking 
actors, including but not limited to law enforcement, decide to (or 
decide not to) collect, analyze and make use of data about victims. 
Applying sunshine also entails asking questions about data-driven 
antitrafficking efforts and evaluating who benefits and who is harmed 
when nuanced experiences of vulnerability and exploitation are 
transformed into decontextualized indicators and data points, and then 
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used to authorize all sorts of activities with all kinds of very real 
consequences. To apply sunshine means centering the experiences of 
end users (i.e., people viewed by tech experts as vulnerable to 
trafficking), who currently have little control or say over how their data 
is used. Finally, to apply sunshine to data practices invites us to think 
more broadly about transparency and the data protection strategies 
most suitable to protecting all people—especially individuals and 
groups vulnerable to labor exploitation as well as heightened state, 
corporate and humanitarian surveillance. The GDPR guidelines to 
support transparency, data protection, and privacy offers one example 
and seems like an interesting framework to consider and possibly build 
upon in future efforts.107 
C.   Do No Harm: Ethics and Accountability in Antitrafficking 
Technology Work 
In addition to considering the policies and regulatory strategies that 
support transparency and data protection, a final idea, “do no harm,” 
is inspired by my conversations with colleagues from the Vienna 
Institute for International Dialogue and Cooperation and LEFÖ as part 
of a workshop we organized in Vienna, Austria, in October 2019, 
focused on ethics and accountability in antitrafficking work as well as 
earlier work centered on a trauma-informed model of care for 
survivors of human trafficking.108 To do no harm is premised on an 
uncomfortable but plain truth: antitrafficking activities can cause 
harm. The cost of data-driven antitrafficking efforts are not necessarily 
monetary but rather can be calculated in terms of inequities that result 
from state-orchestrated initiatives augmented by nonstate actors that 
perpetuate or even exacerbate extant structural vulnerabilities. To do 
no harm may mean that community initiatives, with or without 
                                                                                                             
 107. See Complete Guide to GDPR Compliance, GDPR.EU, https://gdpr.eu [https://perma.cc/EP4Y-
LD3U] (last visited Apr. 1, 2020). 
 108. Annie Fehrenbacher, First, Do No Harm: Designing a Model of Trauma-Informed Care for 
Survivors of Human Trafficking in Los Angeles County, CSW UPDATE (UCLA Ctr. for the Study of 




Musto: The Limits and Possibilities of Data-Driven Antitrafficking Effor
Published by Reading Room,
1172 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:4 
technology, are prioritized over law enforcement approaches (i.e., 
anticarceral, community-based approaches instead of law enforcement 
approaches) and that people in trafficking and exploitative labor 
situations have more control over how data about them is used and in 
what context. 
An examination of technology in the countertrafficking space 
reveals recurring tensions between law enforcement and rights-based 
approaches. It also illuminates assumptions, such as the one that posits 
more law enforcement-focused, nonstate-actor-supported data-driven 
efforts are necessary to securing justice for people in trafficking 
situations. However, a closer look at how technology is used and by 
whom also invites us to ask different questions and to leverage the 
power of our all-too-human creative potential in thinking about how 
to value and prioritize data ethics, transparency, and accountability in 
future countertrafficking work. 
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